Beyond Hormuz:

Energy Security, Strategic Resilience, and the Future of Globalisation

Despite the fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, the economic consequences of the Strait of Hormuz crisis continue to reverberate across global markets.

The disruption of maritime traffic through one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways has immobilised roughly one-fifth of global oil exports and a comparable share of liquefied natural gas shipments, while also constraining the movement of key industrial commodities, including aluminium, helium, and fertilisers.

The economic effects are already becoming apparent. Energy shortages have emerged in parts of East Asia and Australia, transport costs have risen sharply, and fuel markets remain highly volatile.

In the United States, gasoline prices have risen sharply, adding further inflationary pressure at a time when many economies remain vulnerable to supply-side shocks. If disruptions persist, the consequences are likely to extend beyond energy markets, affecting industrial production, trade flows, and broader patterns of economic growth.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has often been compared to the 1973 Arab oil embargo. While the analogy is useful, the current crisis differs in important respects. The oil embargo relied primarily on coordinated production decisions by exporting states. By contrast, the Hormuz crisis highlights the vulnerability of a critical maritime chokepoint through which a substantial share of global energy trade still flows.

The challenge is therefore not merely a matter of supply, but of infrastructure, geography, and strategic access.

Most importantly, recent events have shown that even advanced military capabilities may not be sufficient to ensure uninterrupted commercial navigation through the strait.

Regardless of how the current confrontation is ultimately resolved, policymakers should assume that the risk of future disruptions will remain a recurring feature of the regional security environment.

A Structural Vulnerability in the Global Economy

The central strategic lesson of the Hormuz crisis is that the international economy remains heavily dependent on a small number of critical transit corridors. Although globalisation has diversified sources of production and consumption, many supply chains still converge through a small number of maritime bottlenecks.

Iran has spent decades developing asymmetric capabilities specifically designed to threaten maritime traffic in the Gulf. Mines, drones, anti-ship missile systems, and naval swarm tactics provide Tehran with relatively low-cost tools capable of inflicting disproportionately high economic costs on its adversaries.

Recent events suggest that even limited disruption can create significant uncertainty across shipping companies, insurers, and commodity markets.

The significance of this development extends well beyond the Middle East. It raises broader questions about the resilience of the global trading system in an era marked by intensifying geopolitical competition, economic fragmentation, and growing strategic rivalry among major powers.

Similar concerns increasingly surround other critical chokepoints, including the Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the South China Sea, and even vital digital infrastructure, such as subsea communication cables.

For governments and markets alike, the issue is no longer whether such disruptions are possible, but how often they may occur and how effectively economies can absorb them.

The challenge facing policymakers is therefore not simply one of deterrence but of resilience.

Learning From the 1970s

The 1973 oil embargo prompted a far-reaching transformation of Western energy policy.

Strategic petroleum reserves were expanded, energy efficiency standards were strengthened, and governments sought to diversify suppliers and fuel sources.

These measures did not eliminate vulnerability, but they significantly reduced the ability of individual producers to exert sustained economic pressure through supply restrictions.

The response was ultimately successful not because it prevented future geopolitical crises, but because it reduced the systemic consequences of those crises.

By creating redundancy, diversification, and flexibility, governments diminished any single actor’s capacity to leverage energy dependence for political gain.

Today’s challenge requires a similarly long-term response. The objective should not be to eliminate geopolitical risk—an unrealistic goal—but to reduce the economic and strategic consequences of future disruptions.

This requires moving beyond crisis management towards resilience-building.

Diversifying Routes and Strengthening Strategic Infrastructure

One priority should be to expand alternative export infrastructure across the Gulf region.

Existing pipeline networks in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already offer partial alternatives to Hormuz-bound shipping. Expanding these networks—and integrating additional Gulf producers—would reduce dependence on a single maritime corridor and improve the reliability of global energy flows.

Parallel investments in rail, logistics, and port infrastructure could further enhance regional connectivity and offer alternatives for moving non-energy commodities.

International financial institutions, development agencies, and strategic partners could play an important role in supporting these projects.

The United States, together with its allies, should view these investments not merely as commercial initiatives but as strategic infrastructure projects that strengthen collective economic security.

Financing mechanisms through export-credit agencies, development finance institutions, and multilateral partnerships could support the construction of alternative routes while strengthening relationships with key regional partners.

Such initiatives would also reinforce a broader principle increasingly central to twenty-first-century statecraft: resilience is built not only on military capabilities but also on the physical and economic architecture underpinning global commerce.

Domestic Resilience and Economic Security

At home, major consuming economies should strengthen their capacity to absorb external shocks.

Strategic reserves remain a critical tool, but governments should also consider investing in storage capacity, infrastructure modernisation, and supply-chain diversification.

In the United States, this includes addressing vulnerabilities arising from the geographic concentration of refining capacity and transport networks.

Expanding domestic energy infrastructure, modernising distribution systems, and improving inter-regional connectivity would help mitigate the impact of future supply disruptions.

More broadly, policymakers should increasingly regard economic resilience as a core element of national security.

The distinction between economic and security policy has become increasingly blurred.

Supply chains, logistics networks, energy systems, and critical infrastructure now occupy the same strategic space that was once reserved primarily for military considerations.

The Energy Transition as a Strategic Imperative

Over the longer term, the most effective means to reduce exposure to Hormuz-related disruptions may be to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons.

Energy transition policies are often debated primarily through the lens of environmental sustainability.

Yet recent events underscore their equally important geopolitical dimension.

Expanding renewable energy generation, electrifying transport, investing in advanced storage technologies, and diversifying energy sources can reduce exposure to disruptions in global oil and gas markets while enhancing economic resilience.

This does not imply abandoning conventional energy production.

Rather, it suggests adopting a broader conception of energy security—one that emphasises diversity, redundancy, flexibility, and resilience across the energy system.

An effective energy strategy should therefore combine support for reliable domestic hydrocarbon production with accelerated investment in emerging energy technologies.

The objective is not merely decarbonisation; it is strategic diversification.

The Real Challenge Is Not Iran

A narrow focus on Iran risks obscuring the broader lesson from the Strait of Hormuz crisis.

The principal vulnerability exposed by the conflict is not the behaviour of a single state, but the international economy’s continued dependence on a small number of critical chokepoints through which energy, commodities, and trade must flow.

Even if military operations ultimately succeed in restoring navigation through the strait, they will not eliminate the structural conditions that made the crisis possible.

Future disruptions—whether caused by interstate conflict, terrorism, cyberattacks, political instability, or climate-related events—could have similar consequences elsewhere in the global trading system.

The strategic question for policymakers is therefore not how to prevent every future crisis, but how to ensure that future crises do not produce disproportionate economic and political effects.

From Deterrence to Resilience

The Strait of Hormuz crisis may ultimately be remembered less for its immediate economic costs than for the strategic lesson it provides.

It has highlighted the extent to which global prosperity remains dependent on a handful of critical transit corridors and exposed the limitations of relying solely on military power to secure them.

Even if commercial traffic eventually resumes, the assumption that Hormuz will remain permanently secure can no longer be taken for granted.

Policymakers should therefore focus not only on reopening the strait but also on reducing the global economy’s vulnerability to future disruptions.

The broader challenge is not merely Iran.

It is the persistence of structural dependencies within the international economic system.

Building resilience to those dependencies—through infrastructure investment, diversified supply chains, strategic reserves, and accelerated energy innovation—will be essential to managing future geopolitical shocks without triggering major economic crises.

In the decades ahead, the countries best positioned to navigate an increasingly uncertain international environment will not necessarily be those with the greatest military power.

They will be those that build the most resilient economies, the most adaptable energy systems, and the most diversified networks of trade and infrastructure.

The ultimate lesson from Hormuz is therefore not about the Gulf. It concerns the future of globalisation itself.

The defining strategic challenge of the twenty-first century may not be securing every chokepoint indefinitely, but rather creating an international economic system in which no single chokepoint has the capacity to disrupt global prosperity on a systemic scale.

Anchorage Group Think Tank

yantrapucciano.art@anchoragegroup.org

Trump, Xi, and the Limits of Tactical Stabilisation

The Trump-Xi summit in Beijing ultimately revealed less about resolving U.S.-China tensions than about the evolving mechanisms by which both governments are attempting to manage a relationship increasingly defined by long-term strategic competition.

Meeting in China for the first time since 2017, Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping projected a carefully calibrated image of stability and constructive engagement. The summit featured extended bilateral discussions, ceremonial diplomacy, and highly symbolic public appearances intended to reinforce the appearance of continuity in great-power relations despite mounting geopolitical friction.

Yet beneath the diplomatic choreography, the summit underscored how differently Washington and Beijing continue to define the sources of strategic stability, the acceptable limits of competition, and the future architecture of the international order.

The meetings in Beijing produced positive rhetoric and signs of selective co-operation, particularly in trade and economic relations. Both leaders emphasised the importance of maintaining stable ties, while senior officials pointed to ongoing discussions on tariffs, investment restrictions, artificial intelligence governance, and supply-chain management.

At the same time, the absence of clearly codified agreements reflected a broader structural reality: the United States and China increasingly appear capable of tactical stabilisation without meaningful strategic convergence.

This distinction matters. Over the past several years, the bilateral relationship has shifted away from the earlier paradigm of deep economic engagement towards a more complex framework marked by selective interdependence, managed competition, and persistent geopolitical distrust. The Beijing summit did little to alter that trajectory.

Instead, it demonstrated that both governments are increasingly focused on managing escalation risks while maintaining maximum strategic flexibility.
Strategic Signalling and Divergent Political Incentives
One of the summit’s most revealing features was the divergence in messaging between the US and China following the talks.

The Trump administration emphasised prospective commercial outcomes, including Boeing aircraft purchases, expanded Chinese imports of American agricultural goods, and possible reductions in selected trade restrictions. Such announcements align with the administration’s broader preference for visible and quantifiable outcomes that can be translated into domestic political narratives centred on reciprocity, industrial competitiveness, and economic leverage.

Beijing’s messaging was notably more restrained.
Chinese official statements emphasised broad principles of stability, pragmatic co-operation, and long-term management of bilateral relations, while avoiding detailed public confirmation of many specific commitments cited by American officials. This asymmetry reflected more than diplomatic caution. It illustrated a fundamental difference in negotiating priorities.

Washington continues to place substantial emphasis on demonstrable outcomes and short-term deliverables. By contrast, Beijing increasingly appears focused on preserving strategic optionality and avoiding public commitments that could constrain future flexibility or create perceptions of political concession.

This divergence is becoming an increasingly significant feature of U.S.-China diplomacy.

The Trump administration operates within a compressed political timeline shaped by electoral pressures, economic performance, and domestic perceptions of negotiating success. By contrast, Chinese leadership appears increasingly comfortable operating on longer strategic horizons and slowing the pace of engagement when doing so reinforces Beijing’s bargaining position.

As a result, the summit highlighted an important asymmetry in strategic tempo. The side under greater pressure to demonstrate immediate outcomes often enters negotiations with less flexibility than its counterpart, which is able to prioritise long-term positioning over short-term visibility.
Taiwan and the Centrality of Credibility
Taiwan remained the summit’s most consequential strategic issue, even without formal announcements.

For Beijing, Taiwan is not merely one policy dispute among many, but rather the central political boundary condition governing long-term stability in US-China relations. Chinese readouts placed particular emphasis on Xi Jinping’s warning that mishandling the issue could lead to direct confrontation between the two powers.

From Beijing’s perspective, the Taiwan issue increasingly intersects with broader concerns about sovereignty, deterrence credibility, and the long-term balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

For Washington, however, Taiwan simultaneously serves as a security commitment, a symbol of regional credibility, and a component of the broader alliance architecture in Asia. This creates a structural tension with Trump’s more transactional approach to diplomacy. Statements by the president indicating a willingness to discuss arms sales directly with Xi generated unease among regional allies and partners, who feared that strategic commitments could be subject to tactical bargaining dynamics. Although Secretary of State Marco Rubio later reaffirmed continuity in U.S. policy, the summit nevertheless reinforced broader regional concerns about predictability and signalling.
For Indo-Pacific middle powers, including Japan and Australia, the summit’s significance therefore extended well beyond Taiwan itself. The broader issue concerns whether U.S.-China diplomacy strengthens or weakens confidence in the durability of existing deterrence structures.

In contemporary strategic competition, perceptions of reliability often matter as much as material capabilities do.
Technology Competition and Managed Interdependence
Technology competition remained another central, though largely unresolved, dimension of the summit.

American officials referenced discussions on artificial intelligence safeguards, export controls, and measures to prevent advanced AI systems from reaching non-state actors. Meanwhile, China continued to emphasise broader economic stabilisation while avoiding direct endorsement of American framing on technological restrictions. This reflects a deeper structural transformation in the bilateral relationship.

U.S.-China competition increasingly centres not primarily on traditional trade balances, but on control of the technological and industrial foundations of future geopolitical power. Advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure, rare earth processing, battery supply chains, and industrial-scale manufacturing ecosystems now occupy a central place in strategic competition.

The result is a condition of asymmetric interdependence in which both sides possess significant coercive tools while remaining vulnerable to disruption in sectors dominated by the other.

This dynamic creates strong incentives for selective decoupling and supply-chain diversification. Yet it also limits how far either side can weaponise economic interdependence without incurring significant costs for itself and its partners. Consequently, the summit reinforced a broader trend in the international system: economic integration is no longer viewed primarily through the lens of efficiency, but increasingly through the lens of resilience, strategic exposure, and geopolitical risk management.
Competing Visions of Order
Perhaps the summit’s most important feature was the contrast between how Washington and Beijing appear to conceptualise the future international order.

Xi Jinping’s repeated references to “changes unseen in a century” reflect a longstanding Chinese assessment that the post-Cold War order is undergoing structural transformation. Beijing increasingly views global politics as moving towards a more multipolar system, in which American predominance gradually weakens and regional powers gain greater strategic autonomy.
Within this framework, China’s concept of “constructive strategic stability” appears intended to institutionalise a form of competitive coexistence in which rivalry remains bounded by mutual recognition of core interests and by limits on destabilising actions. The United States, however, remains reluctant to endorse frameworks that could be interpreted as legitimising spheres of influence or constraining American strategic flexibility, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.

This divergence suggests that future U.S.-China diplomacy is likely to remain less about resolving competition and more about establishing guardrails around it. The Beijing summit, therefore, should not be interpreted as a return to strategic partnership or comprehensive engagement. Nor does it suggest imminent decoupling or direct confrontation. Rather, it reflects the emergence of a more durable phase of selective strategic bargaining in which co-operation, competition, deterrence, and economic interdependence increasingly coexist across multiple interconnected domains.

For U.S. allies and partners, the challenge will be to adapt to an international environment in which strategic ambiguity, competitive interdependence, and episodic stabilisation become enduring features of great power relations rather than temporary conditions to be resolved.

Anchorage Group Think Tank

yantrapucciano.art@anchoragegroup.org

Trump’s Beijing Summit and the Emerging Logic of Selective Strategic Bargaining

On May 11, Beijing announced that U.S. President Donald Trump would visit China from May 13 to 15, just two days before the summit was due to begin.

The timing drew attention. Trump had publicly confirmed the visit weeks earlier, while Beijing had kept a deliberately measured public stance, stating only that “China and the United States are in communication regarding U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed visit.” At the same time, preparatory diplomacy had continued quietly in the background, including congressional exchanges and discussions on trade, aviation, tariffs, and agricultural purchases.

Beijing’s delayed confirmation reflected more than protocol management. It illustrated a broader feature of China’s evolving approach towards Washington under Trump’s second administration: maintaining diplomatic engagement while resisting externally imposed political tempo and agenda-setting dynamics.

Trump initially proposed a two-day visit. Beijing announced a three-day schedule. Whether procedural or symbolic, the adjustment carried broader strategic significance. Chinese policymakers appear increasingly focused on ensuring that high-level engagement occurs within a framework that emphasises reciprocity, stability, and sovereign control over political signalling.

This approach can be understood through three overlapping principles: avoid unnecessary escalation, preserve diplomatic flexibility, and limit concessions on issues Beijing regards as core national interests. China has little incentive to reject engagement outright, particularly given the importance of stabilising economic and geopolitical relations. At the same time, Beijing appears equally unwilling to reward highly transactional summit diplomacy that risks creating perceptions of political asymmetry.

The summit agenda is expected to cover multiple areas of strategic competition and interdependence, including Taiwan, trade, artificial intelligence, export controls, rare earth supply chains, Iran, and broader questions of regional security architecture. At the same time, public attention will likely focus on symbolic optics and potential commercial announcements, while the more consequential dynamics concern how both sides seek to convert economic, technological, and geopolitical leverage into a durable strategic advantage.
Taiwan and the Question of Strategic Credibility
Taiwan is likely to remain the summit’s central political issue, even if discussions occur primarily through diplomatic signalling rather than through explicit negotiation.

In Beijing, Taiwan is not merely one component of the bilateral relationship. It represents the principal political boundary condition governing long-term stability between China and the United States. Chinese officials reiterated during preparatory discussions that continued adherence to the One China framework remains essential to maintaining stable relations.
This creates a degree of structural tension with Trump’s negotiating style, which has often emphasised transactional leverage and visible bargaining outcomes. 

Taiwan, however, falls into a fundamentally different category from trade disputes or commercial agreements. 

Any perception that Taiwan could be instrumentalised in broader economic negotiations would likely provoke strong resistance from Beijing while raising concerns among U.S. allies and partners about the credibility of Washington’s regional commitments.

As a result, the summit’s most consequential outcomes may stem less from substantive policy shifts than from diplomatic language and strategic signalling. Beijing is likely to seek stronger reaffirmations of opposition to Taiwanese independence, while Washington will seek to preserve continuity with longstanding policy frameworks without appearing to weaken deterrence credibility.

For regional actors, including Japan, Australia, South Korea, and several Southeast Asian states, the summit’s broader significance lies not only in the specific language adopted by Washington and Beijing, but also in the signals it sends about alliance reliability and long-term strategic consistency.

In the Indo-Pacific, deterrence depends not only on military capabilities but also on sustained confidence in political commitments and institutional predictability.
Trade and the Politics of Managed Stabilisation
Trade is likely to deliver the summit’s most visible outcomes. 

The Trump administration continues to place considerable emphasis on measurable economic outcomes that can be communicated domestically through investment announcements, export purchases, tariff adjustments, and industrial agreements.

Boeing aircraft sales, agricultural imports, and limited tariff changes are therefore likely to feature prominently in summit expectations. Such measures align with the administration’s preference for visible and quantifiable indicators of economic reciprocity.

At the same time, the broader framework increasingly resembles managed stabilisation rather than a return to rules-based liberalisation. 

Both sides appear less focused on rebuilding comprehensive economic integration than on reducing near-term friction while preserving strategic flexibility. China may be prepared to make limited commercial concessions in areas where such measures contribute to broader relationship stabilisation. 
Reduced tariff uncertainty and continued access to the U.S. market remain important considerations for Beijing, particularly amid domestic economic pressures and global market volatility. However, Chinese policymakers are also likely to remain cautious about any framework perceived as granting Washington open-ended political leverage. 

Beijing’s experience with the Phase One trade agreement reinforced concerns about the long-term sustainability of large-scale purchase commitments amid shifting political expectations. In parallel, China’s ongoing diversification of export markets and supply chains has modestly reduced its exposure to bilateral economic pressure, giving Beijing greater tactical flexibility in negotiations.
Technology Competition and Asymmetric Interdependence
Technological competition is likely to remain the summit’s most strategically consequential dimension, even in the absence of major policy breakthroughs.

U.S.-China competition increasingly centres on control of the technological and industrial foundations of future economic and military power. The United States continues to retain structural advantages in advanced semiconductors, frontier artificial intelligence systems, software ecosystems, and cloud infrastructure. 

Washington’s export controls and investment restrictions are intended not only to protect technological leadership but also to slow China’s access to sensitive dual-use technologies. China, meanwhile, retains substantial leverage across critical segments of upstream industrial supply chains, including rare-earth processing, battery materials, advanced manufacturing inputs, and industrial-scale production ecosystems essential to clean energy, robotics, and defence technologies.

This dynamic has created asymmetric interdependence, in which both sides possess meaningful coercive tools while remaining vulnerable to disruption in sectors dominated by the other. The strategic challenge for both governments is that coercive measures may yield diminishing returns over time. 

U.S. technology restrictions encourage China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation and supply-chain autonomy. Meanwhile, China’s use of industrial or rare-earth leverage accelerates efforts by the United States and its partners to diversify sourcing and reduce strategic dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains.

As a result, both sides increasingly face a paradox common to long-term strategic competition: policies designed to strengthen leverage in the short term may ultimately weaken it over the longer term by accelerating mutual adaptation and partial decoupling.

Under these conditions, sustained diplomatic engagement becomes less a mechanism for resolving competition than for managing the escalation risks associated with it.
Strategic Tempo and Negotiating Asymmetries
One of the summit’s underlying asymmetries concerns political time horizons.
The Trump administration appears incentivised to demonstrate tangible diplomatic and economic outcomes amid domestic political pressures, economic uncertainty, and ongoing geopolitical instability. By contrast, Beijing appears increasingly comfortable operating on a longer strategic timeline and slowing the pace of engagement when doing so serves broader Chinese interests.

This divergence shapes negotiating dynamics. 

In great power bargaining, the side facing stronger short-term pressure to deliver outcomes often enters negotiations with reduced strategic flexibility. China’s management of the summit announcement reflected an awareness of this dynamic. Beijing neither rejected the visit nor rushed to confirm it. Instead, Chinese officials maintained diplomatic engagement while signalling that high-level dialogue would proceed within a framework emphasising sovereign control over political timing and agenda management.

From Beijing’s perspective, strategic patience itself increasingly serves as a form of leverage.
What the Summit May Ultimately Reveal
Trump will arrive in Beijing for a major ceremony, and both governments are likely to emphasise stability and constructive engagement. 

Yet the summit’s broader significance should not be assessed primarily through the lens of headline agreements or commercial announcements. The more consequential questions concern signalling, alignment, and strategic positioning.

Will the summit’s language on Taiwan reinforce regional confidence in deterrence stability or create uncertainty about U.S. commitments? 

Will trade arrangements be framed as reciprocal stabilisation measures or as politically asymmetric concessions? 

Will discussions on rare earth supply chains intersect with broader negotiations on export controls and advanced technologies?

For Indo-Pacific middle powers, these questions have significant implications. The U.S.-China relationship is neither returning to the earlier era of deep engagement nor moving towards comprehensive decoupling. Instead, it is evolving into a more complex framework of selective strategic bargaining across interconnected domains, including security, trade, technology, and industrial policy.

Taiwan, tariffs, artificial intelligence, export controls, and rare earths increasingly form part of a single strategic ledger rather than being treated as isolated policy files.

China’s calibrated management of the summit announcement reflects growing confidence in its ability not merely to respond to U.S. initiatives but increasingly to shape the tempo and framing of bilateral engagement.

Anchorage Group Think Tank

yantrapucciano.art@anchoragegroup.org

The Yerevan Spectacle: When European Diplomacy Mistakes Symbolism for Strategy

A Critical Assessment of the 8th European Political Community Summit

 

The eighth meeting of the European Political Community (EPC), convening today in Yerevan, Armenia, offers an instructive case study in how multilateral institutions can conflate geopolitical theatre with genuine strategic purpose — at considerable, largely unquantified cost to European taxpayers and, ultimately, to European credibility.

I. Origins and Original Sin

Created in October 2022 at the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EPC was designed to bring together more than 40 European leaders to foster “strategic intimacy” and strengthen cooperation on continental challenges, including security, stability, and prosperity. 

The founding impulse was understandable: Europe faced an existential shock, and the existing institutional channels — the European Council, NATO, and the OSCE — each had its own structural limitations.
The EPC was inaugurated before it had a clear purpose, agenda, or framework. 

This is not a minor design flaw. 

It is the forum’s original sin, one that has compounded at each subsequent summit.

The start of the EPC is reminiscent of the Union of the Mediterranean — also born of a French initiative — which has now been dormant for several years. 

The historical precedent is not encouraging.

II. Seven Summits, Zero Binding Outcomes: The Evidence

European governments owe their citizens a direct, candid answer to a straightforward question: what, specifically, has the European Political Community decided, agreed, or delivered since October 2022? Examined without diplomatic courtesy, the record is bleak.

At the inaugural Prague summit, leaders expressed unity in the face of war, affirmed support for Ukraine, and committed to “strengthening energy cooperation.” They clarified that the EPC was intended as a biannual informal platform — hence the absence of a declaration. No declaration. No commitments. No accountability mechanism.
This template has been faithfully replicated at every subsequent gathering. Summit discussions, usually organised in plenary and thematic roundtables, have failed to produce a collective dynamic that leads to larger-scale political outcomes. Over time, EPC summits have seen a decline in concrete outcomes, with the fifth summit in Budapest marking a low point, as leaders failed to produce new initiatives or agreements.

Energy security, migration, cybersecurity, support for Ukraine, and regional tensions have appeared on the agenda of virtually every summit — yet none have been resolved. The apologists for this record retreat to the claim that the EPC’s value is intangible: that “strategic intimacy,” personal relationships, and the mere fact of leaders convening in the same room produce diffuse diplomatic benefits that resist measurement.

This argument deserves the scepticism it merits. 

That informality means the EPC is not equipped to deliver concrete projects. 

Proponents themselves, writing in Chatham House, concede as much — while simultaneously arguing that the format has “great potential.” Potential, seven summits in, is an insufficient return on investment.
All the initiatives and projects announced during EPC summits have involved only small groups of participants — meaning that whatever bilateral or minilateral outcomes did emerge could have been, and in most cases would have been, arranged through existing channels without the logistical mobilisation of fifty governments.

A message of cooperation to tackle migration has been repeated across various summits — Granada, Blenheim, Copenhagen — yet no decisive breakthrough can be attributed solely to the EPC. 

Migration remains unresolved. Energy dependence was addressed through EU legislative mechanisms, not through EPC summits. Support for Ukraine has been sustained through NATO and bilateral military packages — not through EPC communiqués.
The most frequently cited “achievement” of the EPC is the diplomatic photo taken in Prague in October 2022, in which Macron, Michel, Aliyev, and Pashinyan appeared together in the same frame. Following the Prague summit, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to an EU peace mission and to de-escalate tensions — though analysts acknowledge this may well have happened without the EPC. 

Today, as Pashinyan hosts the eighth summit in Yerevan, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process has advanced substantially — through direct bilateral diplomacy, EU mediation via the High Representative’s office, and OSCE engagement. The EPC’s marginal contribution to that outcome, if any, remains unproven. Governments are invited to dispute this assessment. They should publish, for each of the seven summits held to date, a concrete accounting: which specific decisions were made, which follow-up mechanisms were established, and which outcomes are directly attributable to the EPC rather than to parallel processes that would have proceeded regardless. Until such accountability is provided, the burden of proof rests with the institution’s defenders.

III. The Accountability Vacuum and Its Costs

The EPC’s structural architecture is not incidentally opaque — it is deliberately so. The EPC operates without a permanent secretariat, a dedicated budget, or staff, with each summit organised by the host country and supported by a limited French taskforce established in January 2023. This deliberate informality raises serious questions about transparency, accountability, and the capacity to deliver tangible results. The absence of a centralised budget does not mean the EPC is free. It means its costs are externalised — dispersed across dozens of national governments and EU institutions, rendered invisible to any aggregate public accounting, and therefore immune to democratic scrutiny. Each host nation absorbs the full burden of organising, securing, and hosting one of the world’s most logistically demanding diplomatic formats, with no standardised reporting requirement on expenditure.
The Yerevan summit illustrates this dynamic in its most extreme form. Security and traffic-control measures were announced across an unprecedented multi-day window encompassing the EPC summit, the first-ever EU-Armenia bilateral summit, a state visit by the French President, and an additional international forum — described as unprecedented since Armenia’s independence in terms of high-level attendance. 

The cumulative cost of mobilising security forces, diplomatic protocols, transport logistics, and state hospitality for nearly fifty heads of government in a capital city with no prior experience of hosting events of this scale will never appear as a single, transparent public line item. It will be distributed, obscured, and forgotten — precisely as the format intends.
Every delegation travelling to Yerevan incurs costs for air transport, security details, diplomatic staffing, and accommodation. For the delegations of 47 states, the EU institutions, and invited organisations, including NATO and the Council of Europe, those costs aggregate to a figure that would, if disclosed in full, generate considerable public discomfort. 

European governments invoking the principle of fiscal discipline in their domestic budgets owe their taxpayers, at a minimum, a transparent accounting of the cost of this form of diplomatic tourism.

IV. The Symbolic Inflation Problem

The 8th EPC summit is described as the largest international political event Armenia has hosted since independence, with 48 heads of state and government expected to attend. However, scale is not strategy. The more leaders attend, the more diffuse the agenda becomes, and the less any single participant can be held accountable for outcomes.
The Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, will attend as a guest — the first time a non-European country has been invited to the EPC meeting. 

This expansion of the forum’s perimeter, rather than demonstrating institutional vitality, risks accelerating the erosion of whatever coherence the EPC still possesses. A European Political Community that formally incorporates Canada raises reasonable questions about what “European” means and whether the forum’s gradual enlargement reflects strategic vision or the institutional equivalent of follower acquisition.

V. What Should Be Done Instead

The critique of the Yerevan summit is not an argument against European engagement with Armenia, nor against the EPC concept in principle. It is an argument for institutional discipline — for aligning form with function, cost with outcome, and ambition with accountability.
Three reforms deserve the attention of European policymakers.
Fixed venue, rotating presidency. 

The G7 has long demonstrated that substantive summit diplomacy need not entail the physical uprooting of governmental infrastructure across continents.

The EPC should establish a fixed institutional home — most naturally in Brussels, where the diplomatic ecosystem already exists at scale — while preserving rotating national presidencies to shape agenda priorities. 

The symbolism of proximity to a given country can be preserved through dedicated bilateral summits held alongside, rather than conflated with, the plenary forum.
Mandatory outcome reporting. 

Every EPC summit should be required to publish, within ninety days of its conclusion, a structured public document that sets out: commitments made at previous summits and their implementation status; the total estimated cost to all participating governments and EU institutions; and a frank, independently reviewed assessment of what was achieved that could not have been achieved through existing mechanisms. 

Without this baseline, the EPC will continue operating as a self-referential performance without external audit.
Rationalised frequency and scope.

Two summits of this magnitude per year are neither necessary nor efficient. 

A biennial plenary format — with ministerial-level working groups in the intervening periods — would substantially reduce costs, concentrate political attention, and impose the agenda discipline that the current format structurally discourages.

VI. Conclusion

Yerevan deserves European attention. The summit takes place following the historic Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, as both countries embark on a pro-European course, developments of genuine strategic significance for continental stability. 

EU investments in Armenia under the Global Gateway are expected to total €2.5 billion, and a new civilian EU Partnership Mission has been established to bolster Armenia’s resilience to hybrid threats. 

These are substantive commitments, reached through institutional channels that operate with or without a summit in Yerevan.
At a moment when European governments are asking their citizens to absorb the costs of rearmament, the energy transition, and structural economic adjustment, the political optics of convening fifty heads of state in the South Caucasus for a one-day meeting with no binding outcomes, no aggregate cost disclosure, and a seven-summit track record of negligible collective deliverables are, to put it with diplomatic restraint, difficult to justify.
European leaders would better serve their constituents — and their genuine partners in Yerevan — by investing in durable institutional mechanisms that produce results long after the motorcades have departed, the communiqués have been issued, and the “family photo” has been archived alongside the seven that preceded it.

The views expressed in this analysis are those of the Anchorage Think Tank and do not represent the official position of any institution.

Anchorage Group Think Tank

yantrapucciano.art@anchoragegroup.org

The UAE’s Strategic Withdrawal from OPEC: Toward a New Architecture of Global Oil Competition

Executive Summary

The United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from OPEC, effective in late April, marks more than an institutional rupture within the world’s most consequential energy cartel. It signals the start of a new competitive era in global oil markets — one in which the architecture of supply is being redrawn at remarkable speed. Considered alongside the accelerating prospect of American strategic engagement with Venezuelan oil production, the Emirati decision may well be remembered as the first move in a fundamental realignment of global energy geopolitics. 

This analysis argues that, taken together, these developments present a historic opportunity to build a more competitive, resilient, and politically diversified global oil market.

OPEC+’s June Adjustment: The Last Rites of Cartel Dominance?

The resolution by seven principal OPEC+ members to raise collective production quotas by 188,000 barrels per diem for June continues a pattern of incremental upward revisions — following analogous adjustments in March and April — that has done little to alter the fundamental supply picture. As analyst Jorge Leon of Rystad Energy observed, the exercise is primarily about signalling: an attempt to convey that OPEC+ “retains command of the situation.”

The claim is increasingly difficult to maintain. 

The ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz renders the quota revision largely theoretical, as actual extraction remains materially below stipulated levels.

The communiqué’s studied silence on the UAE’s departure reinforces the impression of an institution managing appearances rather than markets. 

OPEC+ is projecting authority it no longer fully possesses.

The UAE Decision: Correct, Courageous, and Consequential

This institution’s assessment is unambiguous: the United Arab Emirates made the strategically correct decision to withdraw from OPEC, and the medium- and long-term benefits of that choice are likely to prove substantial — for Abu Dhabi, for global consumers, and for the broader cause of market-based energy governance.

Liberation from Structural Constraint.

For years, the UAE has operated under quota disciplines that had no rational relationship to its actual productive capacity.

ADNOC’s sustained investment programme has positioned Abu Dhabi as one of the world’s lowest-cost, highest-efficiency producers. The cartel framework, dominated by the competing interests of Riyadh and Moscow, served as an artificial ceiling on Emirati ambition. Independence removes that ceiling entirely.

The Emergence of a Sovereign Swing Producer. 

Outside OPEC, the UAE has both the capacity and the institutional credibility to act as a genuine swing producer — one capable of expanding or moderating output in response to genuine market signals rather than politically negotiated compromises. 

This is precisely the kind of responsive, market-oriented actor that consuming nations have long sought as a counterbalance to cartel pricing power. 

In the near term, Abu Dhabi’s ability to ramp up production without seeking multilateral consent represents a structural deflationary force on global crude prices — a direct benefit to energy-importing economies across Asia, Europe, and the developing world.

Strategic Realignment with Western Interests. 

The UAE’s move aligns its energy policy more closely with the strategic preferences of Washington and its allies, who have consistently advocated expanding global production to moderate prices and reduce the revenues available to adversarial petrostate actors. 

An independent UAE, responsive to market conditions and oriented towards long-term partnerships with Western consumers and investors, is a more valuable strategic energy partner than one constrained by cartel obligations shared with Russia and Iran.

Long-Term Revenue Optimisation. 

From a purely fiscal standpoint, the arithmetic of independence is compelling. 

Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth calculus has always pointed towards maximising production over the long run, particularly given the growing structural uncertainty surrounding long-term hydrocarbon demand. 

Freedom from quota constraints enables the UAE to accelerate the monetisation of its reserves while demand conditions remain favourable — a rational response to the energy transition horizon.

The Venezuelan Dimension: A Transformation of Historic Proportions

Perhaps the most consequential near-term development to consider alongside the UAE’s repositioning is the rapidly evolving situation in Venezuela—specifically, the prospect of direct US strategic engagement in Venezuelan oil production.
Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, estimated at around 300 billion barrels. 

Yet chronic mismanagement, sanctions, underinvestment, and political dysfunction under the Maduro government have reduced output to a fraction of its potential — currently estimated at well below one million barrels per day, compared with a theoretical capacity several times higher. 

The conditions for a transformative intervention are, for the first time in decades, plausibly within reach.

American Strategic Leverage. 

The United States has accumulated substantial leverage over the Venezuelan energy sector through its sanctions architecture, its relationships with the Venezuelan opposition, and its engagement with international creditors holding claims against PDVSA assets. 

Should Washington choose to deploy this leverage constructively — whether through a negotiated political transition, a structured licensing arrangement with American energy majors, or a broader international rehabilitation framework — the consequences for global supply could be felt within a remarkably short timeframe.

The Speed of Potential Recovery.

Industry analysts have consistently noted that, despite long neglect, Venezuelan fields retain their geological integrity. 

With appropriate capital investment and operational expertise — both of which American and allied energy companies are uniquely positioned to provide — output could plausibly be restored to between two and three million barrels per day within two to four years. 

That volume, introduced into global markets outside the OPEC framework, would constitute a first-order structural supply shock.

The Compound Effect: UAE Independence and Venezuelan Recovery. 

The strategic significance of these two developments, considered together, cannot be overstated. A fully independent UAE producing at or near capacity, combined with a rehabilitated Venezuelan sector operating under American strategic stewardship, would introduce upwards of four to five million additional barrels per day to global markets — entirely outside OPEC+ control. 

The cartel’s capacity to manage global prices through coordinated restraint would be fundamentally, perhaps irreversibly, diminished.
For consuming nations, this scenario represents a generational opportunity. For OPEC’s remaining members — and most acutely for those whose fiscal breakeven prices depend on sustained elevated crude revenues — it poses an existential challenge to their economic model.

A New Competitive Architecture: Policy Recommendations

The confluence of these developments demands a proactive, coordinated policy response from Washington and allied capitals. 

This institution advances the following recommendations:
First, the United States should formalise its energy partnership with the UAE through a comprehensive bilateral framework — encompassing long-term offtake commitments, joint investment vehicles, and shared infrastructure development — to reinforce Abu Dhabi’s incentive and capacity to produce independently of cartel constraints.
Second, the Administration should accelerate its strategy for Venezuela, treating the restoration of that country’s productive capacity as a strategic energy priority of the first rank. 

A phased sanctions-relief architecture, tied to verifiable political and governance benchmarks, represents the most credible pathway to unlocking Venezuelan reserves at the scale and speed the current geopolitical environment demands.
Third, allied governments should coordinate their engagement with both Abu Dhabi and a prospective post-transition Caracas to ensure that the new competitive supply landscape is embedded within a stable, rules-based framework — one that protects investor interests, ensures transparent market operations, and prevents the re-cartelisation of newly liberated production.

Conclusion: The Dawn of a Post-OPEC Supply Order

OPEC+ retains, for now, its institutional form of market dominance.

What it is losing, with accelerating speed, is the substance. 

The UAE’s departure and the looming transformation in Venezuela are not isolated episodes — they are leading indicators of a structural shift in the global energy order.
The United Arab Emirates had the strategic clarity to act first and decisively. 

History is likely to judge that decision not as a moment of disruption but as a founding act in the new competitive landscape now taking shape. 

The task for policymakers is to ensure that the transition to that landscape is managed with the deliberation, coordination, and long-term vision that such a consequential moment demands.
The post-OPEC supply order is not a distant hypothesis. 

It is arriving — and the nations that shape its architecture today will define the terms of global energy competition for a generation.

This policy analysis was prepared by the Anchorage Think Tank. It reflects an independent institutional assessment and does not constitute investment advice.

Anchorage Group Think Tank

yantrapucciano.art@anchoragegroup.org

The Inevitable Reckoning: Europe’s Strategic Dependency and the Price of Decades of Abdication

A Continent That Chose Comfort Over Responsibility

The announced reduction of U.S. troops from Germany is not a crisis imposed upon Europe. It is a consequence Europe has brought on itself, through decades of deliberate underinvestment, chronic free-riding, and a political culture that consistently prioritised welfare spending and intra-European squabbling over the hard requirements of collective defence. Washington’s recalibration is not a rupture — it is an overdue invoice.

The foundational infrastructure of U.S. military power in Europe — Ramstein, Aviano, and Sigonella — will remain. These installations are too deeply embedded in America’s global operational architecture to be sacrificed on the altar of transatlantic politics. But their continued presence should not be mistaken for validation of European strategic behaviour. They serve American interests first. That Europe benefits from them is, at this point, more a historical accident than a deliberate alliance bargain honoured in good faith.

Eighty Years of Strategic Infantilism

The record is unambiguous and damning. Since the end of the Second World War, European governments have made a considered, rational — and deeply cynical — choice: to allow the United States to bear the overwhelming cost of continental security while redirecting domestic resources towards social spending, industrial subsidies, and the construction of an elaborate institutional architecture in Brussels that produces communiqués rather than capabilities.

NATO’s two-per-cent GDP defence spending target — modest by any serious strategic standard — was formally agreed in 2006. Two decades later, the majority of European member states still had not met it. This is not an oversight. It is a policy choice, repeated across successive governments of every ideological stripe, reflecting a continent-wide consensus that American guarantees were permanent, unconditional, and at no cost.

That consensus was always a fantasy. It has now met reality.

Opportunism as a Governing Philosophy

What makes Europe’s failure particularly striking is not merely the underinvestment — it is the opportunism that has accompanied it. European governments have consistently proved adept at invoking alliance solidarity when it suits their interests and abandoning it the moment it demands sacrifice or coordination.

The response to the current moment is characteristic. Rather than acknowledging decades of shortfall and moving urgently towards self-sufficiency, significant portions of the European political class have chosen indignation — casting American frustration as betrayal and Washington’s entirely reasonable demand for burden-sharing as evidence of geopolitical treachery.

Chancellor Merz’s confrontational posture towards Washington is, in this light, less a principled stand than a domestically convenient deflection from Germany’s own extraordinary failures — a country that spent years deepening its energy dependence on Russia while simultaneously resisting defence expenditure, and which now presents itself as the aggrieved party.

Why Europe Will Never Be a Unified Strategic Actor

The current crisis also exposes, with unusual clarity, the structural reasons why European strategic unity is not merely unrealised but unrealisable in any meaningful timeframe.

The European Union’s fundamental incoherence on security matters is not a technical problem awaiting a technical solution.

It is an expression of irreconcilable national differences that no institutional framework has bridged, nor is likely to bridge.

The Baltic states perceive an existential threat from Russia and call for forward deterrence. Germany’s strategic culture remains paralysed by historical guilt and commercial interests. France pursues strategic autonomy for national prestige rather than as a vehicle for collective European capability. Hungary acts as a systematic spoiler. Southern European states prioritise Mediterranean concerns over Eastern European security.

These are not differences of emphasis — they are differences in fundamental interest and historical experience that render unified strategic agency a category error.

The European Parliament can pass resolutions. The European Commission can publish defence white papers. EU summits can issue joint declarations of impressive length and negligible operational consequence.

None of this amounts to strategic coherence.

None of it translates into deployable capability, unified command, or the collective political will that genuine security provision demands.

Europe is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, a collection of sovereign states whose instinct, when pressure mounts, is to pursue national advantage rather than collective action — and to look to Washington to absorb the strategic residual.

The Reckoning Is Justified

Whatever its precise motivations, the Trump administration’s decision to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Germany lands on terrain that independent strategic analysis has been preparing for years.

The United States has subsidised European security to a degree that has actively undermined European strategic seriousness.

Conditionality — the introduction of genuine consequences for persistent free-riding — is not antagonism. It is the minimum requirement for a sustainable alliance.

Europe now faces a choice it has avoided for eighty years: develop genuine strategic autonomy, with all the fiscal and political costs that entails, or openly acknowledge that it remains a strategic dependent and negotiate the terms of that dependency honestly.

What it cannot continue to do — though it will certainly try — is to enjoy American security guarantees while resenting the power that provides them, to spend below any credible defence threshold while demanding alliance solidarity, and to present its own institutional dysfunction as evidence of American unreliability.

The invoice has arrived. 

Europe’s indignation is, under the circumstances, particularly unconvincing.

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

The effectiveness of the ‘blue chip’ approach in shaping the Anchorage Art Fund’s strategy and its medium-term prospects

In the realm of financial terminology, the term ‘blue chip’ refers to the most robust and structurally resilient companies. When applied to the art market, it describes artists who have achieved established international museum and institutional recognition, supported by a persistent and global demand. These artists are part of major public and private collections, are the focus of museum retrospectives, included in catalogues raisonnés, and regularly appear in international auction circuits.

This segment is limited in scope. The Art Basel & UBS Art Market Report (2019) states that about 1% of works sold at auction account for nearly 50% of the overall transaction value. In essence, it can be argued that the market tends to recognise works that demonstrate a rigorous combination of historical significance, curatorial relevance, and high demand. Within this context, the strategy of Anchorage Art Fund is positioned to prioritise acquisitions with a medium-term horizon — typically between five and six years — based on the expectation of sustainable appreciation rather than short-term speculative activity.

The initial selection criterion is provenance. The provenance of a work of art, meaning its history of ownership, including its presence in notable private collections, institutional collections, and significant previous sales, is a key indicator of quality and legitimacy. For the Anchorage Art Fund, a strong provenance not only provides historical assurance but also directly increases the work’s value over time, thereby boosting its appeal for sale.

The second criterion is the quality of documentation. The work’s critical standing is determined by various factors, including, but not limited to, catalogues raisonnés, official archives, publications, museum exhibitions, and bibliographical references. A work that is fully integrated into the artist’s recognised body of work poses a lower risk and is more appealing to both institutional and private collectors. From an investment point of view, over a five-year timeframe, strong documentation is essential to support revaluation and ensure liquidity upon exit.

An additional factor relates to the coherence of the work within the artist’s overall body of work. It is crucial to recognise that not all works by a historically renowned artist contribute equally to value generation. Elements such as the creation period, formal quality, technique, size, and inclusion in recognised series significantly influence demand depth. The Anchorage Art Fund’s strategy focuses on works associated with key periods in the artist’s career or particularly sought-after cycles. This approach enables a more accurate comparison with previous auction results and improves the predictability of market trends.

Another important factor is the relative liquidity of the secondary market. Despite the inherent illiquidity of art, some segments demonstrate a higher transaction frequency and have geographically diverse demand. The artist’s consistent presence in major international auction houses, stable results, and the depth of the collector base are key indicators for devising an exit strategy within the timeframe planned by the fund.

Based on this, the Anchorage Art Fund focuses its acquisitions on post-war, and 20th-century works by artists who are already recognised by museums and have an active secondary market. The goal is not to exploit emerging trends or speculation, but to find works that have already been endorsed by the international art system and are in robust demand segments.

From this perspective, the five- to six-year investment horizon plays a crucial role. This period supports the ongoing development of the work through critical consolidation, exhibitions, publications, and increased market comparability. It is expected that the asset will not see a sudden surge in value; instead, it will likely appreciate gradually. This steady growth is anticipated to be driven by two main factors: firstly, the artist’s institutional progress; and secondly, sustained international demand.

The Anchorage Art Fund regards the artwork as a valuable cultural asset, part of a complex network of museum, curatorial, and market relationships. The selection process is based on a thorough analysis of the most important series, a comparison with similar transactions, and an evaluation of the work’s position within the artist’s career development. In an environment marked by increasing selectivity, the integration of provenance, documentary quality, historical consistency, and relative liquidity becomes a crucial factor in creating value over the medium term and developing an effective exit strategy.

The Anchorage Art Fund operates based on the following principles: acquiring blue-chip artworks with strong fundamentals, supporting their appreciation over time, and reintroducing these works to the market once demand has matured, in line with the established investment horizon.

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

Stati Generali della Sostenibilità & Sicurezza: Giovanni Sabetti Launches the Challenge of Transatlantic Cooperation

ROME – On the occasion of the Stati Generali della Sostenibilita and Sicurezza, promoted by the E-Novation Foundation, Giovanni Sabetti delivered a speech outlining the new frontiers of global security, announcing the creation of a new foundation in the United States dedicated to protecting critical infrastructure and the food supply chain.

Cybersecurity and Food Security: Two Sides of the Same Coin

In his speech, Sabetti emphasized the inseparable link between seemingly distant domains: A cyberattack on strategic infrastructure and the disruption of a food supply chain produce the same result: they undermine social stability and citizens trust.

The new US-based organization, of which Sabetti is an active promoter and organizer, aims to bridge this gap by creating a shared transatlantic security framework.

The Geopolitical Context and the Role of Expertise

Analyzing the current international crisis landscape, Sabetti raised two key points:

The exclusivity of expertise: Only a limited number of global players currently demonstrate the real capacity to manage security as a common good, operating with surgical precision while minimizing human impact.

Governance of technologies: Artificial intelligence and emerging technologies require not only shared ethical standards but, above all, top-tier training. The current lack of precision represents a risk to global stability.

Security should not be perceived as a cost, but as a strategic investment. Without clear governance of technologies, instability is bound to grow at every level.

Italy and Europe in the Global Arena

Sabetti expressed strong appreciation for the work of the Italian government, highlighting:

Renewed engagement in the Middle East and North Africa: A restored role as a strategic mediator in the MENA region.

Protection of Made in Italy: Ongoing efforts to promote agri-food and artisanal excellence, confirmed by steady export growth.

Finally, addressing the European Union, Sabetti called for a strengthening of diplomatic and educational pathways, essential pillars to reinforce the transatlantic alliance and ensure the protection of communities.

Founder IRI

Massimo M. Lucidi

directors@internationalreputationinstitute.com

Dialogue for Change: Sustainability Is Becoming Performative—Because Real Dialogue Is Missing

Governments and corporations are announcing ambitious climate policies, but without genuine dialogue, they risk producing fragmentation, geopolitical friction, and symbolic action instead of measurable change.

The sustainability transition is increasingly defined by announcements. Net-zero targets, green industrial strategies, transition plans, and climate alliances are unveiled with growing frequency. Yet implementation continues to lag, coordination is weakening, and geopolitical tensions are rising. The uncomfortable conclusion is becoming harder to avoid: sustainability risks becoming performative—more about signalling ambition than negotiating the difficult trade-offs required to deliver results.

The missing ingredient is not technology, capital, or policy ideas. It is dialogue. Not consultation after decisions are made, not diplomatic messaging, and not public alignment statements—but real dialogue that shapes decisions before they are finalised.

Today, too many sustainability policies are designed in isolation and announced as faits accomplis. Governments pursue domestic industrial strategies without fully engaging partners affected by supply chain shifts. Regulatory frameworks are introduced without alignment with cross-border implications. Companies publish ambitious targets without resolving internal trade-offs between cost, risk, and operational feasibility. The result is a growing gap between what is announced and what is implementable.

The transatlantic climate relationship illustrates this dynamic. The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism seeks to protect climate ambition. The United States’ Inflation Reduction Act aims to accelerate the deployment of clean technology through domestic incentives. Both policies are defensible. Both respond to real political constraints. Yet their interaction has generated friction over competitiveness, trade distortion, and industrial relocation. These tensions did not emerge because the EU and the United States disagree on climate goals. They emerged because policies with global implications were developed without sufficiently deep dialogue on how they would interact.

This is becoming the norm rather than the exception. Diverging hydrogen certification schemes, competing battery supply chain strategies, and fragmented sustainable finance taxonomies are creating complexity that slows investment and increases costs. Each initiative individually advances sustainability. Collectively, they risk fragmenting the transition. The absence of dialogue turns parallel ambition into structural misalignment.

The same pattern is evident within organisations. Sustainability commitments are announced publicly, while internal conversations about trade-offs remain unresolved. Finance teams continue to apply traditional return thresholds. Procurement maintains cost-first incentives. Operations face conflicting performance metrics. Sustainability teams are expected to deliver transformation without the authority to do so. When dialogue is absent, commitments become symbolic rather than operational.

This performative dynamic is reinforced by incentives. Public announcements are rewarded. Alignment work is slow and less visible. Negotiating trade-offs requires confronting difficult realities—higher costs, longer timelines, and shifting priorities. Without structured dialogue, it is easier to announce ambition than to build agreement. The result is sustainability for the show, rather than sustainability for implementation.

This is precisely why “Dialogue for Change” should evolve into a think tank with a deliberately challenging mandate: to expose where the absence of dialogue is producing performative sustainability rather than real transformation. The objective is not to criticise ambition, but to demonstrate that ambition without dialogue can slow progress.

Such a think tank would document cases where sustainability policies created unintended geopolitical consequences because coordination came too late. It would analyse how corporate commitments fail when internal stakeholders are not aligned. It would identify where regulatory fragmentation increases costs and reduces effectiveness. Most importantly, it would highlight that these outcomes are not inevitable—they result from decisions made without structured dialogue.

This is not an argument for slower policymaking. It is an argument for better policymaking. Dialogue does not mean consensus at any cost. It means engaging stakeholders early enough to understand trade-offs, anticipate impacts, and design more resilient strategies. Without this step, sustainability risks becoming a series of competing initiatives rather than a coordinated transition.

The need for this shift is urgent. Climate policy is now intertwined with industrial competition, energy security, and technological leadership. Decisions made in one jurisdiction reshape incentives elsewhere. Companies reorganise their supply chains in response to policy signals. Investors respond to regulatory fragmentation. In this environment, acting without dialogue carries systemic risks.

Dialogue for Change would therefore aim to move sustainability from signalling to coordination. The think tank would provide evidence that the absence of dialogue has measurable consequences: delayed investment, policy conflict, fragmented markets, and weakened implementation. It would also offer practical frameworks for integrating dialogue into policy and strategy design.

The provocative reality is that sustainability does not currently suffer from a lack of ambition. It suffers from too little alignment. Governments are speaking loudly, but not always listening. Companies are committing publicly, but not always negotiating internally. Stakeholders are consulted, but rarely engaged early enough to shape outcomes.

If the next phase of the transition is to succeed, sustainability must move beyond announcements. It must confront trade-offs openly, align incentives deliberately, and coordinate across borders and functions. That requires dialogue—not as a communications exercise, but as a governance mechanism.

The transition will not accelerate because actors announce more targets. It will accelerate when they start talking—early, honestly, and constructively—about how those targets will actually be delivered. Dialogue for Change proposes to make that shift visible, measurable, and actionable.

 

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

 

Growing demand from European high-net-worth clients emphasises gap in wealth management expertise.

Wealthy investors across Europe are increasingly incorporating art into their investment portfolios, but private banks are finding it difficult to meet the rising demand for specialised advisory services.

Research from the Italian Private Banking Association (AIPB) indicates that although an increasing number of high-net-worth families are investing in art, only a small proportion of financial institutions presently offer comprehensive guidance on managing artistic assets. About one in five Italian private banking families already invests in art, a higher percentage than those investing in private equity or cryptoassets. Nearly a quarter of investors plan to increase their exposure, implying that cultural assets are becoming a more strategic element of wealth portfolios.

Despite this growing interest, the services provided by financial institutions remain fragmented. According to the study, 75% of Italian private banks offer artwork management tools, 63% provide valuation services, and 56% assist clients with buying and selling artworks. However, only 19% deliver a fully integrated art advisory service.

The gap between supply and demand is becoming more evident. While 30% of private banking clients expect dedicated support in managing their artistic patrimony, only 18% have so far used services designed to structure or enhance their collections. Industry experts say this reflects a wider challenge across Europe’s wealth management sector, where art advisory often remains peripheral to core banking services and is frequently managed by external specialists.

Diversification beyond traditional assets

The growing interest in art reflects a broader shift in how wealthy investors allocate their capital. As clients seek diversification and protection from market volatility, art and collectibles are increasingly considered alongside traditional alternatives such as private markets, real estate, and hedge funds.

The global art market was valued at approximately $57bn in 2025, although it remains highly concentrated. Only 0.85% of artists generate more than 76% of total auction revenue, while the top 1% of artworks — those sold for over $1m — account for roughly half of all transaction value. In contrast, works priced below £50,000 account for 94% of transactions but only 15% of market value, emphasising the dominance of high-end collectors and institutional buyers.

Auction results reveal a similar trend. In 2024, post-war and contemporary art accounted for 55% of auction sales, followed by modern art at 25%, with post-war works generating returns of 11.2% over the past 12 months.

New investment models emerge

Financial innovation is also transforming the art market. One emerging structure is the club deal, which allows groups of investors to acquire shares in high-value “blue-chip” artworks — typically pieces by internationally recognised 20th-century artists valued at more than €500,000.

These models aim to overcome some traditional barriers related to art investment, such as illiquidity, limited access, and information asymmetry. Digital technologies and tokenisation are also beginning to expand access to this asset class. Art’s historical performance has also attracted investor interest. The Artprice100 index has increased by over 620% from 2000 to 2024, indicating strong long-term value retention while showing relatively low correlation with conventional financial markets.

Collectables gain prominence in private wealth

Beyond art itself, collectables are becoming an increasingly important part of private wealth portfolios. The value of privately owned collectables rose by 18% in just two years, increasing from $2.17tn in 2022 to $2.56tn in 2024, and is expected to reach $3.47tn by 2030. Reflecting this shift, the share of investors who view collectables as a store of value has increased from 14% in 2023 to 25% in 2025.

Paintings remain the most widely held category, representing 27% of collections, followed by sculpture and digital art, each at 14%. Looking ahead, demand is expected to increase, with 48% of collectors planning to purchase paintings, 37% sculptures, and 23% digital works.

Succession planning becomes critical

Another challenge for collectors and wealth managers alike is succession. According to the research, eight in ten investors inherit their art collections, making the management of artistic assets an increasingly vital part of long-term wealth planning.

For European private banks, the increasing importance of art in client portfolios offers both a challenge and an opportunity. Organisations that succeed in merging financial expertise with art market knowledge may gain a competitive edge as demand for specialised advisory services continues to grow.

However, for now, the data indicates the industry is still in its early stages. Bridging the advisory gap — and more fully integrating art into wealth management strategies — could become a key differentiator in Europe’s private banking sector.

 

Peace as a Strategic Capability: Europe’s Fragmentation in a Competitive Security Environment

The announcement of a “Board of Peace” at the World Economic Forum reflects an important shift in how major actors conceptualise conflict and stability. Peace is increasingly treated not as a post-conflict condition but as a strategic capability: the ability to shape escalation dynamics, control negotiation frameworks, and influence post-conflict political orders.

From a strategic assessment perspective, this development exposes a critical weakness in Europe’s geopolitical posture. While other major powers integrate peace processes into broader security and influence strategies, the European Union remains constrained by internal fragmentation, limiting its ability to act decisively in an increasingly competitive security environment.

Peace as a Tool of Strategic Influence

In the current international system, marked by prolonged confrontation and regionalised conflict, peace processes have become instruments of power. Control over mediation formats, ceasefire mechanisms, and post-conflict arrangements enables actors to shape security architectures and political trajectories without sustained military engagement.

The strategic logic behind initiatives such as the Board of Peace aligns with this reality. By prioritising early engagement, institutional continuity, and cross-domain coordination, such initiatives aim to influence conflicts before they crystallise into irreversible security dilemmas. This reflects a broader trend in which stability management is treated as a component of strategic competition.

Comparative Strategic Positions

A comparison with other major actors highlights Europe’s relative disadvantage.

The United States embeds peace processes within its alliance system and deterrence posture. Whether through NATO, bilateral security guarantees, or diplomatic pressure, Washington shapes the strategic boundaries of conflict resolution, even when not acting as a formal mediator. Institutional cohesion enables strategic continuity.

China has selectively expanded its engagement in mediation and peace facilitation, using these efforts to reinforce its long-term influence, particularly in regions where Western security credibility is contested. Peace initiatives align closely with economic and political objectives.

Russia treats peace processes as coercive instruments. Through ceasefires, frozen conflicts, and controlled negotiations, Moscow leverages its capacity to escalate or de-escalate violence to secure strategic depth and political leverage, particularly along its periphery.

In contrast, Europe lacks a comparable ability to integrate peace processes into a coherent security strategy.

Europe’s Internal Fragmentation as a Security Constraint

Europe’s limitations are structural rather than declaratory. Four factors are particularly relevant from a strategic assessment perspective:

1. 1. Divergent threat prioritisation
      Member states assess security risks differently: eastern states emphasise territorial defence and deterrence; southern states focus on instability in North Africa and the Sahel; others prioritise economic security or normative concerns. This prevents convergence on strategic objectives.

1. 1. Decision-making constraints
      Unanimity requirements and dispersed authority across EU institutions and national governments inhibit rapid or anticipatory action. Peace-related initiatives default to lowest-common-denominator outcomes.

1. 1. Doctrinal ambiguity
      There is no shared European doctrine that treats peace processes as instruments of power. As a result, mediation and conflict prevention are disconnected from defence planning and strategic foresight.

1. 1. Temporal misalignment
      Peace governance requires sustained engagement over extended periods, whereas European political systems remain oriented towards short-term crisis management.

These factors combine to limit Europe’s capacity to shape conflict environments proactively, even in regions of direct strategic interest.

Strategic Implications

From a security perspective, Europe’s fragmented approach carries several implications:

• Reduced strategic autonomy, with continued dependence on US-led frameworks for security outcomes in Europe’s neighbourhood.
• Diminished influence in conflict mediation, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, where other actors increasingly determine negotiation formats.
• Erosion of deterrence credibility, as the inability to shape peace frameworks weakens Europe’s leverage in managing escalation and de-escalation dynamics.

In a security environment characterised by persistent instability rather than clear end states, the inability to act coherently in peace governance constitutes a strategic liability.

Key Judgments

• Peace processes have become integral to strategic competition, not peripheral diplomatic activities.
• Major powers increasingly treat mediation and conflict management as security tools.
• Europe’s primary constraint is internal fragmentation, not a capability shortfall.
• Without doctrinal and institutional adaptation, Europe will remain reactive rather than strategic in managing conflict and stability.

Conclusion
The emergence of initiatives such as the Board of Peace signals a broader transformation in international security: the management of peace is becoming a core dimension of power. For Europe, the challenge is not a lack of commitment to peace but the absence of strategic coherence. Unless peace governance is integrated into security planning and aligned across member states, the European Union will remain a secondary actor in shaping the future conflict environment.

By Roberto Pucciano

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

 

The End of the Globalisation Era

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

The New Era: An Age of Convergence

What is emerging in place of globalisation is not a single organising principle but a convergence of domains that were once treated as distinct.

During the late 20th century, economic policy, national security, technological development, and geopolitics were managed as largely separate spheres. Markets allocated resources, governments set rules at the margins, and strategic considerations were confined to defence and diplomacy.

That separation has collapsed.

In the new era, economic competitiveness, technological leadership, and national security are increasingly inseparable. Decisions about trade, investment, research funding, and infrastructure now carry strategic consequences. The result is not merely a more interventionist state, but a more integrated one.

Technology as the Site of Convergence

No domain illustrates this convergence more clearly than advanced technology.

Artificial intelligence, quantum systems, space-based infrastructure, and clean energy technologies are simultaneously:

• drivers of economic growth
• enablers of military and intelligence capabilities
• foundations of political influence and strategic autonomy

Quantum technologies are particularly instructive. Quantum computing, sensing, and communication collapse distinctions between civilian innovation and strategic capacity. Their development depends on state-backed research, secure supply chains, and controlled knowledge flows. They cannot be efficiently governed by open markets alone.

As with space infrastructure and advanced AI, quantum systems operate in what might be termed “strategic space”—domains where technological advantage translates directly into geopolitical leverage.

 

From Globalisation to Strategic Convergence

The globalisation era assumed that economic integration would dilute political rivalry by aligning incentives. The age of convergence reverses this logic: economic and technological systems are now deliberately shaped to serve strategic goals.

This explains the return of industrial policy, the tightening of investment screening, and the politicisation of supply chains. These are not temporary distortions but structural responses to convergence.

Institutions such as the World Trade Organization, designed to manage economic exchange in isolation from power politics, are increasingly misaligned with this reality.

Meanwhile, strategic competition—most visibly between the United States and China—accelerates convergence by forcing governments to align economic and security priorities more tightly.

CEO ANCHORAGE GROUP

Roberto Pucciano

Roberto.Pucciano@anchoragegroup.org

 

Protecting Reputation in the Digital Age. Clarification Regarding Nicola Caputo

In light of recent media coverage related to the so-called “Epstein files,” IRI International Reputation Institute considers it necessary to intervene to reaffirm the principles of responsible journalism and factual accuracy.

The name of Nicola Caputo has been improperly associated by certain social media channels and news outlets with matters lacking any verified factual basis.

Nicola Caputo previously served as a Member of the European Parliament and as Regional Councillor for Agriculture in Campania. He has also recently been appointed Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Export and Internationalization of the Agri-Food Supply Chain. He is widely respected across the national political landscape for his professionalism, competence, and public service.

IRI confirms that Mr. Caputo — contacted directly by the Institute’s founder, Massimo Lucidi — unequivocally stated his complete lack of involvement in, or connection to, Jeffrey Epstein or any individuals or environments related to the case.

Mr. Caputo has also publicly reiterated this position through his official social media channels, clarifying that he is not the individual referenced in the documents, that he has never had contact with Epstein or his network, and that he has initiated appropriate legal action to protect his image and reputation following the unauthorized use of his name and photograph.

IRI International Reputation Institute emphasizes a fundamental principle: the mere appearance of a name in international archival records does not, in itself, constitute evidence of personal involvement. In highly exposed media environments, the frequent occurrence of name similarities requires heightened caution and rigorous source verification before linking identities, images, and professional histories to unsubstantiated claims.

The reputation of a public figure must not be subjected to summary judgment based on speculation or unsupported associations.

In an era of instant communication, reputation is both fragile and strategic. For this reason, IRI urges all media professionals to exercise consistent responsibility: verify before amplifying, contextualize before interpreting, and clearly distinguish facts from assumptions.

Protecting individuals — particularly those serving in institutional roles — requires rigorous journalism and a public culture grounded in accuracy, balance, and respect.

In closing, the Institute’s founder, Massimo Lucidi, stated:

“Reputation is not a secondary aspect of public life — it is a civic infrastructure. Defending it means defending the quality of our democracy.”

Founder IRI

Massimo M. Lucidi

directors@internationalreputationinstitute.com